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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

#### 6 November 1962

## THE SITUATION IN CUBA

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| 3. Soviet perso  | onnel appear m | ore active t | han ever in |  |
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| ernational Brigade of<br>een reporting is made<br>eapons, and is drill | de up of forei | gn Communist |             |  |
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Khrushchev agreement a "compromise to common sense and peace," but the bloc line generally continues to be that the Communists achieved a major success in obtaining a US promise not to invade Cuba. Kosygin incidentally pays only lip service to the Berlin issue, with no mention of a deadline or a separate peace treaty.

- 7. There is no significant change in bloc military posture. A Northern Fleet tug which has been associated with submarines is headed for the Western Atlantic, suggesting one of the F-class subs which have been at sea since late September or early October may be having trouble.
- 8. Eight Soviet freighters, six tankers, and two satellite freighters now are en route to Cuba. This includes two of the fast freighters with hatches big enough to handle missiles. They could reach Havana by 19 November.

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY





# THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

6 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

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### TOP SECRET



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#### THE SITUATION IN CUBA

About half of the missile transporters and launching equipment previously identified at the MRBM sites now have appeared in Cuban ports.

MRBM missile transporters at the port of Mariel have been loaded on the decks of Soviet ships in the harbor, and one of the ships is apparently leaving port. Moscow thus appears to be shipping missiles from Cuba without waiting for ships capable of carrying them below deck.

Some MRBM equipment, including 12 missile transporters, has been seen near the port of Casilda, which is on the southern coast of Cuba near Trinidad. Casilda was not identified as a port of entry for MRBM equipment during the missile build-up in Cuba, and it does not appear to be a logical port for the removal of equipment from the known offensive missile sites, none of which are in this area.

presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba. No unusual security measures which would be suggestive of warheads or nosecones were noted at any port facilities.

There is also no evidence of any intention to withdraw Soviet IL-28 jet light bombers from Cuba. Low level photography revealed the presence on 4 November of 9 of these aircraft and fuselage crates for an additional 20 at San Julian airfield in Pinar del Rio Province. It also disclosed 9 IL-28 fuselage crates at Holguin airfield in Oriente Province. These are almost certainly those observed on the Soviet vessel Leninsky Komsomol before it docked at a Cuban port near Holguin on 20 October. Together with the four fuselage crates observed at a transshipment point near San Julian, the newly identified crates boost to 42 the number of IL-28 aircraft known to be in Cuba.

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TOP SECRET

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Holguin airfield, which was enlarged earlier this year, is apparently becoming an operational air force installation. Messages ordering resumption of civil air operations said no use of Holguin would be permitted until further notice.

One report

indicates that Soviet pilots under Soviet GCI control are flying coastal patrols.

Soviet fighters were also carrying out intercept exercises on 5 November. Aircraft involved in these air defense operations may be MIG-21s equipped with air-to-air missiles. The introduction of Soviet fighters, intercept control units, and associated air defense communications at this time could mean that attempts will be made to intercept and knock down US low-level surveillance flights. At the least, the extension of Soviet air defense operations means that the USSR is determined to provide a comprehensive air defense for Cuba.

Cuban propaganda media on 5 November continued to reflect a lack of information on the status of talks between Cuban leaders and Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan. Some clue as to the progress of these talks or on any changes in the attitude of Castro regime officials towards the USSR may be given tonight by veteran Cuban Communist leader and agarian reform chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who is to deliver the keynote speech at a public commemoration of the October Revolution.

had seen no evidence of fear or panic among Cuban militiamen, civilians, or foreign Communists up to the time he left Havana on 2 November. He said many Cubans do not understand the crisis because they have little access to non-Cuban press and

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#### **BLOC-CUBA**

Moscow is not reporting any details on Mikoyan's Cuban talks. Apparently the Soviet leader expects to remain in Havana at least until Saturday. reported from Havana on 3 November that the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy there had informed him that "the distinguished foreign representative"--presumably Mikoyan--would stay on for a week.

Bloc spokesmen continue to emphasize the line that Soviet actions during the Cuban crisis saved world peace. The advance text of Soviet Party Presidium member Kosygin's speech at the Kremlin today on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution notes the President's "solemn declaration" that there would be no invasion of Cuba. Kosygin cites this as justification for withdrawing Soviet missiles from Cuba, since the "presence" of these weapons "lost its purpose." He addresses himself to the question of "who gave in to whom" and responds, "we consider that this was a compromise from both sides, a compromise to common sense and peace."

In line with Moscow's current de-emphasis of the German question, Kosygin pays only lip service to the issue. He asserts that the Soviet peoples want firm guarantees "today, and not after some indefinite period of time," against the repetition of German aggression, but says nothing about a deadline or a separate treaty.

The 5 November Pravda carried an article by Polish leader Gomulka defending the Soviet back-down in Cuba. He claimed that the USSR scored the major achievement of obtaining a US promise not to invade Cuba.

Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov followed the same line at the eighth party congress in Sofia. His speech yesterday drew loud applause, according to a Western press account, but the head of the Chinese Communist delegation sat back silently with folded arms.

In China, the Peiping regime continues to inveigh against any sign of Communist weakness on Cuba. For the third day running, mass demonstrations were organized throughout the country in support of Castro's "five just demands." Echoing the mainland press, Communist newspapers in Hong Kong are scoring policies of "appeasement." One newspaper indicated its disagreement with "some people" who felt that "Cuba is too small a country to risk a war with the United States."

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In its roundup of world reaction to the Cuban crisis, the Chinese Communist party newspaper People's Daily quoted an Albanian article as saying that the world would allow "no repetition of the events in the Congo. nor another Munich intrigue."

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# SOVIET BLOC MILITARY FORCES

| No significant change has been noted in the start of the major bloc military forces. | tus |
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#### SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

There now are eight Soviet dry cargo ships, six Soviet tankers and two satellite dry cargo ships bound for Cuban ports. These include the ORENBURG and the OKHOTSK, fast Soviet freighters with large hatch openings (76 by 36 feet) capable of carrying ballistic missiles and transporters below deck. Both could arrive in Havana about 19 November.

The third Soviet ship of this class, the OMSK, was scheduled to load ore in Novorossisk on 3 November for a voyage to Japan. It seems likely that this schedule will be followed.

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